The talks in the Kremlin took four days. The interned politicians joined in as well. The talks resulted in the so called Moscow Protocol, which basically confirmed and legalized the occupation. František Kriegel was the only person who did not sign the Protocol. The broken politicians returned to Czechoslovakia on 27th August 1968. In April 1969, Husák became the first man of the KSČ. Dubček was transferred to Turkey as an ambassador and in 1970 he was expelled from the party. Normalization was in full swing.

Plans and reality differed

There are a number of sources accessible on the Internet dealing with the Moscow talks. One thing is certain, all important Czechoslovakian and Soviet politicians of that time took part in the talks. The only unexpected participant was Gustáv Husák. He came to Moscow together with president Svoboda, nobody invited him, he basically invited himself. Everyone was surprised and the only person who was delighted by his presence was L.I. Brezniev. He felt that Husák is the man who would put things in order again in Czechoslovakia.

The talks were heated and nervous, as they did not go to the plan. Originally, the talks were not even meant to take place. The occupants thought that a revolutionary workers’ and peasants’ government would be established. It would constitute the country’s new leadership and the apprehended politicians would be treated as traitors.

But the reality was different. Ordinary Czechs and Slovaks played an enormous role during the occupation. They were deprived of their leaders and had nobody to rely on but themselves. Yet, they were experienced and confident that they had gained during the preceding years and months. The week starting on 21st August is without any question the most heroic period of the modern Czech and Slovak nations. The unwillingness to fight together with passive resistance proved to be the most effective weapon. Armed resistance would have stood no chance after the invasion and more importantly it would have made the situation and the legalization of the invasion easier for the occupants.

The way it was, an army numbering 750,000 soldiers, equipped with tanks, airplanes, artillery and rockets, senselessly invaded a country that did not fight back, did not defend its strategic points, offices, airports, crossroads or bridges and yet they were not able to make the country do what they wanted them to do. The country was unified in its resistance and kept on going without its political leadership. The occupants failed to stop the radio and TV broadcasting, distribution of press, infrastructure still functioned well along with the telephones and supplies. The invasion was denounced by the president, the government and the parliament of the Czechoslovakian Socialist Republic and the minister of foreign affairs, Hájek, required urgent negotiations of the United Nations Security Council. 1,200 delegates from all over the country gathered for a secret meeting of the KSČ, which also denounced the aggression. The nation unitedly backed up Dubček, Černík, Smrkovský and Svoboda. We are with you, be with us, too was the nations message to its leaders. And thanks to the good operation of media, the whole world heard the news. There was no room for disinformation and counterpropaganda.

It was more than harsh

It is therefore clear, that under these circumstances, the Soviets could not be successful in creating the planned workers’ and peasants’ government, which would sufficiently legalize the invasion. They found themselves in a very delicate situation. The Soviets had no explanation for the groundless and unjustified military aggression against a peaceful country. That is why they were left with no choice but negotiations. They invited an official Czechoslovakian delegation to Moscow and on the delegation’s firm request, they also invited all the representatives of the KSČ, that were at the beginning interned somewhere in eastern Poland.

When Alexander Dubček woke up on the morning of 23rd August 1968 in the Kremlin, he was surprised that he was still alive. He had supposed that his fate would be similar to Imre Nagye’s, the Hungarian reformatory leader from the year 1956 – i.e. execution. But this did not happen. Instead, Dubček found himself with a personal doctor who, when he saw how profound Dubček’s depression was, prescribed him some antidepressants.

Eyewitnesses think that Dubček’s depression started at the moment when the first invasion airplanes landed in Prague’s Ruzyně Airport. When resignedly waiting for the Soviet tanks to arrive from the airport to the KSČ’s building, he took out a letter from his pocket that he had kept from everybody until that moment. In the letter, Brezniev had informed him in advance about the invasion.

On account of Dubček’s health, he did not take part in all the rounds of the harsh negotiations. At first, the Soviets took advantage of the fact that the interned participants knew nothing about the present situation at home. It was therefore possible for them to threaten with martial law, giant political processes and literally “masses of dead civilians”. The gloomy atmosphere was not even dispersed by president Svoboda who arrived in Moscow on 23rd August. He had fought in World War II and had personal experience with war lead by the Soviets. He is said to have stressed several times in Moscow, that he had already seen masses of dead bodies and that he did not want to see such a thing ever again“.

The situation somewhat changed on 25th August when other Czechoslovaks arrived in Moscow. They knew what the situation was like at home and thus could tell the Czechoslovakian delegation about the society’s moods and attitudes and the fact the people were standing up for Dubček and other representatives of Prague Spring.

Also the position of the Soviet party was not as brutal as at the beginning. There was a simple reason for that. Foreign political evaluation of the invasion was obviously negative, thanks to the minister of foreign affairs of the ČSSR, Hájek, who was at that time in the USA and had brought this topic up at a UN meeting. Reports from the army sources were not very optimistic, either. They, for example, stated that ordinary soldiers do not understand the reason why they were doing the service. They had been told that they would free a befriended country from counterrevolution and that people would cheer them and welcome them. But it was not difficult for the soldiers to see that the reality was completely different. The bad mood of the soldiers was also deepened by the fact that their “brother Czechoslovakian army refused to help them in any way and in a few cases its units were ready to resist them. We could also mention some dramatic situations that occurred in the first days of the occupation, e.g. on our western border. In some cases, the tanks were defied by frontier guards, who were paradoxically trying to avoid a wider conflict. The thing was that the final line for the army was in the Soviet maps drawn several kilometres beyond the border, in the German territory.

Worse than Munich

Although the negotiating position was gradually changing in favour of the Czechoslovaks, in the end the Soviets had it their way. They managed to persuade most of the participants that it was better to sign the proposed documents than to worsen the situation more than it was. The majority agreed to it and those who hesitated eventually joined them too. The only exception was Kriegel, who risked that he would not return back home from Moscow. However, the others said that either all of them or none of them would go back to Prague.

The fact that a communiqué was signed at the end of Moscow talks as well as the secret protocol, which confirmed the occupation of the country and its so called "limited sovereignty" and which bound Czechoslovakians to gradual "normalization" of the situation based on Marxism-Leninism and to the realization of a number of concrete Soviet requirements. That meant that the Moscow negotiations lined up the most despicable moments of our history, frequently compared to the Munich Agreement from 1938.

Source: totalita.cz, memories of some of the participants, the press of that time