Talks at Cross-Purposes

The venue of the talks was the result of a compromise. Dubček wanted to hold the negotiations in Košice but Brezniev was against this. Czechoslovaks, on the other hand did not agree with the Ukrainian town of Lvov, which had been proposed by Brezniev. In the end both parties agreed to meet in Čierná nad Tisou, although there was not even a proper place that could hold such negotiations. The only possible place was the union clubroom at the railway station. The talks began on 29th July 1968. Most of the time, the discussions took place right on the train by which the Soviets arrived in Čierná. Every evening the Soviets left to spend the night on their side of the border, in a hotel in the nearby Uzghorod, which paradoxically belonged to Czechoslovakia at the times of the First Republic.

For both parties, the talks were nerve-wrecking

The talks were marked by a nervous atmosphere and it was probably right there in Čierná nad Tisou that the Soviets made their final decision to invade Czechoslovakia and crush Dubček’s leadership by force.

During the four-day long talks, Brezniev asked Dubček to get rid of some politicians that were at the head of the Communist Party (KSČ), mainly Josef Smrkovský and František Kriegel. There were even some verbal anti-Semite attacks, when one member of the Soviet delegation and the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communists in one person Piotr Selest described Kriegel as "Jew from Halič Haliče".

The Soviets also demanded dissolution of those organizations that they considered antisocialist, such as KAN (Club of Committed Non-Party People) or K231 (an organization of former political prisoners from the 1950’s).

However, what Brezniev loathed the most was the newly gained freedom of Czechoslovakian media. He complained to Dubček that Czechoslovakian journalists readily attacked the Soviet Union.

There is a five-page long record made during the negotiations on the train, which for a long time remained top secret. It was kept in a hidden place in the archives of the Central Committee and until 1989 it had been read by very few people.

The first day of the talks was the day of sharp, confrontation monologues of the Soviet delegation against Dubček, Černík and Smrkovský. Brezniev then suggested that they all talk to test all of the members of the Czechoslovakian delegation. Czechoslovaks accepted the suggestion. The Soviets were very disappointed with the outcome of this test, as it appeared that the only people they could rely on were Bilak, Kolder, Švestka and Riga. President Svoboda, Pillera and Barbírka more or less backed Dubček up.

During the talks the Czechoslovakian delegates headed by Alexandr Dubček defended the reforms that had taken place in their country saying that the process of democratization did not mean a withdrawal from the socialist path.

Nonetheless, according to some sources, the KSČ delegation yielded the pressure that was exerted on them in Čierná nad Tisou and promised, amongst other things, that they will reintroduce censorship, strengthen the leading position of the party in the country, abolish the KAN and the K231 and that it will remove some people from their office, including the rebellious member of the presidium František Kriegl.

In the end, Dubček met Leonid Brezniev in his compartment and promised him that the Czech Communists would fulfil what the Soviets required. The interesting thing about this meeting was the fact that the two politicians talked to each other in their pyjamas.

In order to break the resistance of the Czechoslovakian delegation concerning Soviet Army bases in Czechoslovakia, Brezniev wanted to invite other leaders of the five parties of the Warsaw Pact to Čierná nad Tisou. When Dubček refused, Brezniev suggested organizing a meeting of six countries in Bratislava, which the KSČ agreed to.

According to the historian Tomáš Vilímek, the most interesting thing about the meeting was that both sides thought that they had pushed through what they wanted to. Dubček thought that he would partially fulfil Moscow‘s requirements, e.g. that the massmedia would be partially under control or that the leading position of the Communist party would be strengthened, even though in a slightly modified form. Brezniev, on the other hand, did not think there would be any compromise. As far as he was concerned, the requirements were actually an order which was not to be discussed.

In his speech to the nation, which Dubček delivered after his return from Čierná nad Tisou, he spoke about a satisfactory outcome of the talks. Yet in his memoirs written years after that, he admitted that the only outcome of the meeting was the agreement that the six countries of the Warsaw Pact would meet in Bratislava. "No other agreement was reached or signed in Čierná."

Brezniev has not given the signal, yet

The plan of the military intervention had been ready for a long time. Its code name was Dunaj (Danube). All the army were waiting for was the political decision. It was an unwelcome surprise for the “hawks” in both the political bureau and the army’s leadership that the Soviet political bureau agreed by vote in Čierná (5:4) that all possibilities of a political solution be exhausted first and the military intervention be postponed. The political bureau promised to the Czechoslovakian delegation that the accusations made in Čierná and even before in Warsaw, will not be the topic of the Bratislava talks.

Mlynář’s memoirs “Mráz přichází z Kremlu” (Frost is Coming from the Kremlin) and Šimon’s memoirs “Klobouk od Brežněva” (A Hat From Brezniev) show that all this was Brezniev’s work. Both memoirs state that the hawks“ had put Brezniev’s position in danger. After the invasion Brezniev told Šimon, that had he not given the order to invade Czechoslovakia, Šimon would not be sitting there opposite him, but most probably, he, himself, would not be sitting there talking to him, either.

Talks continue in Bratislava on 3rd August

The six countries of the Warsaw Pact, i.e. Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union met in Bratislava on the 3rd August where they finally signed a joint statement including two key sentences. The first of the sentences was later used by Moscow as a justification of the invasion, as it described "protection and reinforcement of socialistic achievements“ as "a joint duty of all socialist countries". Czechoslovakian representatives were calmed by a statement saying that the co-operation would be based on the principles of "sovereignty and national independence and territorial untouchability".

Conservatives invited the Soviets

It was not until 1992 that Russian archives released another document which is supposed to be linked with the Bratislava meeting. The so called letter of invitation was allegedly given over to the highest placed Soviet official Leonid Brezniev by Vasil Bilak in Bratislava. In the letter, the representatives of the conservative wing of the KSČ asked for help by any possible means against the danger of counter revolution. Besides Bilak, the letter was signed by other members and officials of the central committee of the KSČ: Alois Indra, Antonín Kapek, Drahomír Kolder and the chief editor of Rudé Právo Oldřich Švestka, who was also a member of the ÚV KSČ’s presidium. Later it came out that probably even already in Čierná nad Tisou a similar letter was handed in to Brezniev. The letter was written by Antonín Kapek, a candidate for the presidium of the ÚV KSČ. We treat the case of the “invitation letter in a separate article.

Talks under the watchful eye of the public

The talks in Čierná and in Bratislava drew the attention of millions of Czechoslovakian citizens. Everybody was worried about the outcome. People sent thousands of letters and telegraphs to express their support for the leadership of the KSČ. At the same time, a massive action took place in Czechoslovakia. It was called the "Fund of the Republic". Companies and individuals donated money to redress the country’s economy. In only two weeks the fund gathered some 160 million CZK and more than 40 kg of gold.

Some other socialist countries also expressed their support for the leadership of the KSČ, namely Romania and Yugoslavia. Out of all the western communist parties, only West Germany’s and Greek’s communist parties denounced the development in Czechoslovakia in July 1968. The French Communist Party even suggested calling an international conference of communist parties and act as a mediator between Prague and Moscow in order to sort things out. Both parties, however, refused the offer.

Prague Spring also had the support of the public in Western Europe, as opposed to western politicians of the highest ranks who did not really want to get involved. The USA was not eager to get involved, either, just for the sake of one East European country and they labelled the disputes between Prague and Moscow inner communist confrontation.

Source: www.ksl.wz.cz, libri, totalita and others