An interesting fact is that Munich 1938 remains a synonym of betrayal even for younger generations which did not directly witness it. Little has changed over the last two decades, when we have been free to discuss the causes of the Munich betrayal.
And what if it is all the other way round. The more time passes, the less objective we get. On one hand, we have kilometres of archival documents – a number of different kinds of documents from all possible sources, on the other hand, the assessment of the event itself must derive from the experience we have today and from today’s views on what is happening in the world. Besides, every assessment is indeed subjective. It is natural, that we see one and the same thing from different angles. And this is how the Munich Agreement, made on 29th September 1938, was seen by Adolf Hitler, Neville Chamberlain, Eduard Daladier, Benito Mussolini and at home by President Edvard Beneš. Just like today, they all saw the event in a different light.
A strange phenomenon
Munich 1938 was a very particular event in the Czech environment. In fact, it had a double effect. The first one was the separation of those areas that traditionally belonged to the Czech state. The second was the birth of a phenomenon that marked all the generations. And while the first problem was solved by the restoration of the original borders and by declaring the Munich Agreement as null and void, the phenomenon still remains and we somehow do not seem capable to come to terms with it.
When I was doing my research in order to write about this topic, I came across many interesting reflections. They greatly differed, which only convinced me that in fact historically, we speak about the Munichs. The first one is the historic event and all that preceded and followed, the other one is its interpretation that has been forged over the last few decades. This second life of Munich, as somebody very eloquently wrote, would not be so extraordinary in itself. However, in the Czech environment, it has taken on an unexpected dimension and it pushed the event itself aside. Due to this, maybe all of us have been at some point facing one of the most hypothetical of Czech historical questions – Should we have or shouldn’t we have defended ourselves in 1938?
It is not true that there were no fights on the borders
First and foremost, it needs to be said, that in 1938, Czechoslovakia fought back. From approximately mid-September, the country was repeatedly attacked by our enemies, first Germany, then Poland and Hungary. This sabotage or in today’s terminology terrorist war lasted almost ceaselessly until March 1939 and claimed some two hundred lives of Czechoslovakian soldiers, gendarmes, police officers and members of the financial guard. Although a number of these armed conflicts were of a rather extensive character, it did not reach the Czech historical awareness.
Let’s get back to the question whether we should have defended ourselves or not. In order to defend ourselves we need somebody to attack us. In this respect, the lapse of time proved as a good ally. Many things suggest that there was no will for an open military conflict at the time of Munich, not only on our part but also on the part of Hitler’s Germany. Documents show, that not only the Czechoslovakian, but also the German army were not ready to enter a war. It is therefore not just an illusion, it is a fact, that Germany, which was expected to attack, preferred a political solution in September 1938. And for the first and the last time, it decided to play its risky game of “their last requirements” until the very end.
This was not a revolutionary idea. Yet, just as others, it raises the question – What would have happened if? Would Hitler have attacked us or not, if we had refused the Munich Dictate. It needs to be stressed here, that the dictate was international. However, this only leaves us with another hypothesis. Germany knew that France and England would not interfere with a potential conflict. After all, it was the fault of Czechoslovakia that it refused peaceful settlement on the matter at the price of its own dishonour. But would it be enough to make Germany declare war, when its army was not yet well prepared? The German army without any doubt outnumbered the Czechoslovaks, yet the Czechoslovakian army at that time was relatively well equipped. The truth is that nobody knows what would have happened. And it goes for all of the other dozens of theories, truths, half-truths and myths.
Beneš was not a defeatest
As I have said earlier, views on the seventy-year old historic event are and most probably will be for at least some time purely subjective. The same applies to how people view the role of the Czechoslovakian President of that time, Edvard Beneš. I personally tend to think that he was one of those who were affected the most by Munich, this event marked him and gave him the label of a defeatist, which he had to bear until his death. The thing is that Edvard Beneš was and still is seen by many as the person responsible for the Munich catastrophe. And yet, it was thanks to him that Czechoslovakia was probably the only country in Europe that was prepared to face Hitler.
It is similar with another myth about Munich. It is generally claimed that the submission to the Munich Agreement meant irreparable damage to the moral of the nation and that it was the cause of all the bad things that happened in our country later on, such as occupation, the Communist regime, the events of 1968 and so forth. Putting aside the fact that no one knows what would have happened if things had been different, i.e. if we had defended our country, this widespread theory is only based on wishes and facts taken out of context. There is no historical evidence for it. Let’s just take the general conviction about mass collaboration and minimal resistance in the occupied Czech lands. This assertion cannot stand up to the historical reality. Let’s not forget that a widespread resistance movement came to life as early as in 1939, which in spite of its great losses lasted until the liberation. This was a big accomplishment, as no other European nation or country was occupied for such a long time during World War II, no other European country was as far from the foreign resistance centres as Czechoslovakia and what is more, Czechs and Slovaks had historically minimal experience with resistance activities. It is not a coincidence that the losses in the corps of commissioned officers of the Czechoslovakian Army were one of the greatest amongst the allies fighting against the Nazism. The Czech society, however, refuses to take this into account just as it does with the combats in 1938 and 1939.
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It is hard to estimate how much time will be needed for us to come to terms with the Munich Agreement from 1938. It might never happen. It might take just a few more years. I think that people should look more ahead. It is important to have the rear-view mirror, yet the windshield is still more important than that.
František Sládek